Civil society organisations are often seen as playing a crucial role in helping to mitigate the exclusion of weaker states, giving voice to marginalised communities, and raising environmental and developmental concerns within the trade system. The politicisation and demystification of the global trade agenda by civil society also opens space for a more diverse set of actors to influence trade negotiations. This article examines the evolution of the WTO secretariat's engagement with civil society within this context and argues that the dominant mode of engagement, as manifest in WTO Public Forums and civil society participation in ministerial conferences, is no longer fit for purpose. Rather it reflects an outmoded strategy that once served to underscore the existence and value of the WTO as an international organisation and now works to neutralize political contestation and publicly promote the benefits of free trade. It is now in need of reform.
Reforming WTO-civil society engagement
Much of the recent commentary on the state of the multilateral trading system has focused on the lack of consensus among member states on how to reinvigorate the World Trade Organization's (WTO) negotiating pillar (see, for example, Hoekman, 2012; DeereBirkbeck, 2011) . This is unsurprising given the travails of the Doha negotiations and the decision to set the round aside at the organisation's 10 th ministerial conference in Nairobi in December 2015 (see Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2016 ). Yet, as WTO officials have been quick to remind us, behind the drama of the Doha round the non-negotiating aspects of the multilateral trading system have continued to function, and to do so well (see Azevêdo, 2015) . The Dispute Settlement Body, though perhaps slightly overburdened, has been praised for dampening tensions between members that might otherwise have become headline events (Marceau, 2015) . The Trade Policy Review Body has continued monitoring member state compliance in a manner that has not caused major ripples. However, the smooth functioning of the WTO's non-negotiating aspects has meant that they have not been subjected to the same kind of reform-orientated scrutiny as the system's negotiating function (see, among others, Meléndez-Ortiz, Bellman and Mendoza, 2012; Warwick Commission, 2007; and Steger, 2009 ). Certainly, scholars and commentators have offered important suggestions for ironing out the creases in the dispute settlement and trade policy review processes (see, among many others, Hoekman, 2012; Georgiev and Van der Borght, 2006) , but little beyond fine adjustment has been mooted. Yet, very little has been said of the adjustments and reforms that could be made to the manner in which the WTO secretariat engages civil society. This is particularly pertinent given that-in contrast to other areas of WTO competence-no official review or reform process has been countenanced since a formal mode of engagement between the secretariat and civil society was first crafted. This does not mean, however, that reforming secretariat-civil society engagement has been entirely absent from the reform agenda. (WTO, 2013: 31) . It simply means that to date no concerted effort has been put into reforming and refining the means by which the WTO engages civil society.
There are good reasons to suggest that attention should now be turned to reviewing and reforming the manner in which the secretariat engages civil society. It is certainly the case that few, beyond a small hard core, now choose to demonstrate during WTO ministerial conferences; the proportion and the character of NGOs present during the organisation's annual Public Forum has changed; and the way the secretariat engages non-state actors has evolved and matured. All of this has been helped by a shift in the focus of public debate about trade towards mega-regional trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as the tectonic geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic movements that have occurred in wider world politics (see, for instance, de Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015) .
It is also the case that the manner in which the WTO engages civil society has been too narrowly focused on institutional needs and outcomes, rather than on more wide ranging objectives. This is perhaps unsurprising, but it has ensured that the WTO is out of step with those other international organisations that have sought to deepen and widen their engagement with public stakeholders (see Scholte, 2012) ; and it has put the WTO behind the curve in harnessing the role that civil society can play in setting agendas, shaping the way issues are understood, implementing and operationalising global norms (Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark, 2005) , and enhancing transparency, legitimacy and accountability (Buntaine, 2015) . As such, secretariat-civil society engagement is in need of the same kind of reform-focused reflection that has been directed towards the rest of the multilateral trading system.
Our purpose in this paper is to illustrate how, in its current form, the secretariat's engagement with civil society inhibits that relationship from utilising the positive contributions that opening up the organisation to greater public engagement and scrutiny can bring. We argue that currently constructed secretariat-civil society engagement remains largely focused on a public relations strategy that was originally designed to underscore the existence and value of the WTO as an international organisation at a time when its purpose had been called into question. In developing our argument, the paper unfolds as follows. It begins by defining our terms and mapping out the changed nature of the civil society with which the secretariat engages.
The paper then turns to the changed purposes that underpin the secretariat's engagement with civil society as well as the enduring character of the mode of engagement that was put in place more than 15 years ago. Thereafter, the paper explores the impossibility of broader, transformative social outcomes emerging from the mode of engagement's current construction. The paper concludes by reflecting upon the possibilities that a changed mode of engagement might hold.
The changed nature of civil society at the WTO By WTO-civil society engagement we are concerned primarily with relations between the secretariat and civil society rather than the WTO as a collection of members-though the latter are not unimportant particularly as it is upon the mandate given by member states that the secretariat is able to act. In this regard we are concerned with the secretariat not simply as a servant of the membership as it is often constructed, but also as an agent acting upon the authority bestowed upon it by the membership. We take civil society to be private individuals and representatives of non-state groups including NGOs, labour (organised and unorganised), academics, business associations, and consumer organisations. More often than not, in the context of the WTO, civil society is taken to be NGOs alone, but this is only for convenience of mind and needs to be treated with caution. Equally, we need to be a little wary of the term 'public'. In everyday usage, the term public is often treated synonymously with civil society. However, in the WTO context public is understood more in the sense of openness-hence it is a mistake to assume that we can draw a simple association between civil society and NGOs engaging with the WTO and a more wide ranging public engagement programme. The WTO's broad approach to what constitutes public engagement is problematic in itself, as by including a greater range of actors-such as for-profit corporations-the space for civil society groups, particularly those with transformative agendas, has been increasingly crowded out. It is, nonetheless, an important point to note in terms of the evolution of the primary manifestation of the means by which the WTO engages with civil society-that is, via the Public Forum and ministerial conferences.
The context of WTO-civil society engagement has changed dramatically since the demonstrations that first accompanied the 1998 ministerial conference in Geneva. Those events, and the on-the-streets public protests that followed during the Seattle (1999), Cancún (2003) , and Hong Kong (2005) ministerial conferences-not to forget the smaller demonstrations that took place inside these events and which would often get NGOs banned from attending press briefings during ministerial conferences-are now rare (see Wilkinson, 2003; Hopewell, 2015; Pianta, 2014) . The last time a ministerial conference was held in Geneva in 2011, for instance, the only lasting demonstration was an unstaffed tent opposite the conference centre decked out in a few bedraggled banners. In Bali in 2013 the handful of demonstrations that took place were far removed from the conference centre and out of the sight of member delegations. Demonstrations in Nairobi in How marked have these shifts really been? As Figure 3 shows, since 2010 business groups (comprising for-profit industry representatives as well as non-for-profit business associations) have contributed the most participants, reversing the preceding norm wherein NGOs were typically the largest group. In 2013, business registered fully 55 per cent more delegates than NGOs, though this subsequently fell back to 27 per cent more in 2014.
NGOs now typically make up the fourth largest group of participants, having also been overtaken by state representatives and representatives of universities and schools.
Representation from other potentially more critical civil society groups has also fallen back. opportunities that the Forum affords) is actually more pronounced than has been suggested (consider, for instance, Woll, 2013: 258) . Importantly, civil society-private, nonstate, not-for-profit groups-has over time become a less important constituency at the Public Forum, which might be a trend worth reversing if secretariat-civil society engagement is to have any continuing value.
The WTO secretariat provides one additional entry point for NGOs working on traderelated issues in addition to the Public Forum and the side-lines of ministerial conferences.
Geneva-based organisations can apply for accreditation to the secretariat, receive regular briefings from the secretariat, and attend public hearings of some of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
The changed purposes that underpin the secretariat's enduring engagement with civil society
Despite the changes that we observe in the composition and behaviour of civil society at Public Forums and ministerial conferences, the way the secretariat engages civil society has not changed markedly at all. It remains largely unidirectional, constructed to 'educate' and 'celebrate' the benefits of trade leaving unaltered the mechanisms governing WTO-civil society engagement. That said, there has been a change in the purposes underpinning that engagement that has resulted from the changed circumstances in which the WTO has found itself. It is important to understand why this combination of continuity in machinery but change in purpose has come about, as well as the effects on secretariat-civil society relations. To do this we need to recover briefly the genesis and evolution of WTOcivil society engagement.
The events of Geneva in 1998 and (infamously) Seattle in 1999 set in motion an institutional strategy designed to engage civil society that sought, simultaneously, to:
1. promote public understanding of the benefits of trade;
2. dissipate civil society hostility towards the WTO and the multilateral trade agenda; and 3. preserve an arm's length relationship between members and civil society groups.
What resulted was a mode of engagement that privileged a uni-directional flow of information about the benefits of trade and the WTO from the secretariat to civil society but which had very little in the way of a feedback mechanism. As the DDA became ever more intractable-and more generally interest in global economic issues dissipated-the reasons for persisting with this mode of engagement shifted towards underpinning the continued relevance (indeed, the indispensability) of the WTO in the face of challenges that threatened to encourage a contrary view (for statements from WTO Directors General concerning threats to the organisation, see WTO, 2012; WTO, 2014) . In this way, a shift occurred from a mode of engagement designed to dissipate civil society hostility to one that sought to shore up and justify the WTO's raison d'etre. Yet, while the underlying reasons may have changed, the mode of engagement did not. We explore each of these phases in turn.
In the first phase, the secretariat sought to keep public interest in the WTO and its work at arm's length, with the responsibility for civil society engagement in WTO and related affairs firmly placed with member states, resisting the movement of non-state actors to lobby the WTO directly (Scholte, O'Brien and Williams, 1998) reflected a knee-jerk and defensive response on the organisation's part, as did the attempt to deflect criticism from itself and towards member states as the 'appropriate' venue for raising issues of concern. This was, however, to change. If the secretariat's first response was defensive and 'educational' (in that it sought to combat criticism by disseminating its
own ideas about what it is that the WTO is and does), it soon morphed into a mode of engagement principally about political neutralization. This change in policy has been most evident during ministerial conferences as well as during Public Forums but it has also been manifest in a shift in the language of publically available documents and the way the institution now presents itself virtually (a shift that the move from '10 common misunderstandings ...' to '10 things the WTO can do' illustrates).
In seeking to defuse some of the political tension around meetings the secretariat has had some success. With regard to ministerial conferences, the secretariat has been able to meet the obligation of hosting these meetings while at the same time divorcing them from the 'heat' of the negotiations and the ire of some quarters of civil society. This was the case at In sharp contrast to its previous ministerial gatherings, the World Trade Organization's 7 th ministerial conference in Geneva (30 th November to 2 nd December 2009) proved to be something of a success. This was perhaps not surprising. The meeting was actively engineered from the outset to be a 'nonevent', an institutional stock-taking exercise, and a routine gathering rather than an ambitious negotiating session attracting large scale demonstrations and political grandstanding among the delegates.
Scott and Wilkinson continued,
[T]he meeting's only real 'success' was that it was hosted in such a way that enabled some of the political heat to be taken out of WTO ministerial conferences moving the institution back to a more technocratic pace. This was precisely because, as Faizel Ismail, Head of the South African Delegation, put it, 'there is zero going on', a lack of industry (particularly with regard to the Doha round) which Alan Beattie likened to 'the rough equivalent of holding the 1919 Versailles conference without talking about the war' (Beattie, 2009 ).
This strategy of neutralization has also been evident in WTO Public Forums (listed in table negotiations. It includes, among other things, the significant up-scaling of the institution's data collection and analytical capacity, a joint initiative with the OECD to measure 'valueadded in trade', and a significant increase in the number of working papers produced. The secretariat has also made extensive use of video and podcast technology, YouTube, and
Twitter. It has established a 'chairs programme' of identifying and appointing university professors with the title of 'WTO Chair' (ostensibly aimed at supporting the developing world in its trade policy strategies) designed to build lasting relationships with the institutions involved by encouraging members to engage in outreach and communication activities and to establish links with think tanks, but which actually has only appointed scholars uncritically disposed to the status quo.
In 2011 the WTO launched its Youth Ambassador Programme (YAP) 7 designed to increase awareness of trade issues among younger people, to encourage their participation in public discussions on this theme, and to introduce new perspectives to debates-albeit that this has been targeted at disseminating the 'right' kind of knowledge rather than facilitating genuine debate. In 2009, the WTO Essay Award for Young Economists was introduced-and with it a CHF5000 prize-to further promote links between academia and the WTO and 'promote high-quality research on trade policy and international trade co-operation'. As the list of award winners attests, this is an activity that is aimed at promoting trade orthodoxy rather than engaging with heterodox viewpoints.
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Across all of these activities a strategy can be seen in which the secretariat seeks to encourage engagement with civil society that is narrowly focused. Whether it is the way it seeks to neutralize political contestation during ministerial conferences and Public Forums, or the selection of a winner from the YAP, the emphasis is on promoting the 'right' kind of knowledge about the WTO rather than stimulating critical thinking or engagement. And while this might be an entirely understandable strategy for a secretariat feeling the heavy weather of a stalled (and now, a set aside) Doha round, the consequence has been to preserve an increasingly outmoded way of engaging with civil society.
The result of all of this has been, first, to establish, then second, embed and consolidate an asymmetrical mode of engagement. Like all modes of engagement, as well as other institutional processes, once created they generate a life of their own. They establish a culture of operating that is learnt, carried forward, institutionalised and seldom questioned. Perhaps now we need to stand back and ask questions about whether this mode of engagement is really appropriate or fit for purpose.
The impossibility of broader social outcomes from the existing mode of engagement
Why does any of this matter? It matters because this mode of engagement is deeply constraining and it has resulted in a dry, unquestioning forum wherein the raising of concerns about the appropriateness of where the global trade system is going are excluded.
For example, by determining the substantive agenda of the primary meetings during which the secretariat and civil society engage (such as the theme for each Public Forum), debate can only ever be about particular issues; and while it may facilitate the airing of differences of opinion, inevitably there is an underlying objective to promote one way of thinking about global trade and the WTO. It is important to note here that to criticize what has gone on in the Doha round or to call into question some of the tactics that members use to strong arm others into accepting deals they might not otherwise have accepted is not to be anti-trade, nor is it to be anti-WTO. It is certainly to raise questions about the kind of trade regulation that has prevailed over the past 70 years which has seen the industrial states get more of the opportunities they already have while simply letting the rest scramble around for what they can get; but it is not against an organisation that serves global commerce in a way that opens up opportunities to the excluded, which privileges capacity building in areas that have none (but in which potential exists), and it certainly is not a slight on the individuals who work in the secretariat.
The problem is that the mode of engagement that has developed between the secretariat and civil society is one that preserves the status quo and does not produce innovative thinking about the global trading system-some of which could actually contribute to its better and more effective functioning. As a result, nothing of substance, or of note comes out of WTO Public Forums or of the organisation's engagement with civil society at ministerial conferences. Contacts are made, networks are established, information is gathered, and familiar arguments are rehearsed. While this is not without some value, a dialogue of this sort fails to generate an outcome beyond the purposes for which secretariat-civil society engagement was first designed. What a sufficiently significant outcome might look like is beside the point for present purposes, not least because we make no claim to represent civil society or the range of views held therein. What matters is that the chances of a mode of engagement producing something it was not designed to elicit are slim, in much the same way that WTO negotiations currently configured are unlikely to produce outcomes that are equitable and beneficial to all members (Wilkinson, 2014) .
The possibilities that a changed mode of engagement holds
Recent work concerning the influence of civil society on the WTO has drawn attention to the lack of success that coalitions of NGOs have had in either shaping or blocking the liberalisation agenda (Pianta, 2014; He and Murphy, 2007) and how this has been manifest in a problematic mobilisation against any form of multilateral trade agreement (de Bièvre, 2014 ). Yet, engagement between the WTO and civil society is often portrayed as an important element of making the global trade system more legitimate and democratically accountable (Williams, 2011; Piewitt, 2010; Steffek, 2008; Higgott and Erman, 2010) . In an early academic intervention on the relationship between civil society and the WTO, Scholte, O'Brien, and Williams (1998: 6-8) this benefit. In addition, they note the potential democratising effects of greater engagement by citizens' groups in the WTO, and the pitfalls of alienating potential civic partners if engagement with civil society were treated merely as a public relations exercise (Scholte, O'Brien and Williams, 1998: 7) .
Hannah (2016) debates and who cannot (Hannah, Scott and Trommer 2016) . Weakening these barriers could give rise to a third prospective benefit: giving voice and recognition to otherwise marginalised groups that have been silenced by decades of asymmetric and iniquitous trade deals. Improving the transparency of multilateral trade negotiations may also result if civil society has forums in which to monitor, scrutinise and assess the development and impact of proposed trade policies. A fourth possible benefit is that civil society may also improve the accountability of trade negotiations by publicising grievances or naming and shaming in public contexts (Hannah, 2014 The analysis above suggests that the mode of civil society engagement that the WTO has put into place has not made the most of the potential benefits and, simultaneously, not avoided all the pitfalls. While it is certainly understandable that a still nascent institution facing the kind of pressure precipitated by the events of Seattle in 1999 would seek to manage civil society engagement as a means of neutralising criticism, that time is now over.
It is time to step back and confront the reality that the WTO has generated a type of engagement with civil society that is no longer fit for purpose.
Looking ahead
What should be done? How can the secretariat generate opportunities for civil society to challenge meaningfully and transform conventional wisdom about global trade? Here are a few ideas, most of which relate to the Public Forum but which resonate for broader secretariat-civil society engagement, particularly at ministerial conferences.
First, the WTO should resist the temptation to define the terrain on which engagement with civil society takes place. At present, senior members of the secretariat, under the guidance of the Director General, agree on a topic for each Public Forum that determines in large measure the areas of debate to be explored. Each panel proposal has to specify how it is addressing that core theme, though this rule may not be followed entirely to the letter when panels are chosen for inclusion. Nonetheless, it inevitably constrains areas of debate.
Second, and relatedly, the WTO should take steps to allow civil society to have an input into the agenda setting process, possibly through the creation of a consultative committee that brings together representatives of civil society broadly defined. Currently, panellists for the Public Forum propose topics that are adjudicated by secretariat staff, with roughly a 50
per cent success rate, based on quality and congruence with the overarching theme of the event. Broadening the selection process would increase the legitimacy, accountability, and transparency of civil society outreach by the WTO and ensure that the topics being discussed reflected the areas of concern to civil society. Such an improvement in secretariat autonomy over the Public Forum would also require the DG to play a less decisive roll in setting the theme and an openness to themes that may not speak to the interests and priorities of the most dominant WTO members.
Third, the secretariat should allow a proverbial hundred flowers to blossom in the conversations that take place around trade. Too much effort is currently exerted in defending the benefits of trade and of the multilateral trade system to let genuine debate flourish. For instance, situating a debate around the topic 'Trade Works!'-as it was in 2015-necessarily gives a certain direction and hue to discussions, and largely excludes those who are more critical. While it is reasonable for the WTO to maintain some level of oversight concerning which groups can attend, this should be kept to a minimum.
Excluding such voices closes off fulsome debate and limits the possible outcomes of civil society engagement with the WTO.
Fourth, the secretariat should create opportunities for civil society to ask not what trade
does, but what can trade do if we connect it up with a real development agenda that targets the poorest and least able, and that transfers knowledge that benefits everyone. This puts the secretariat in the role of enabler. By doing this, and not feeling the need to pursue dogmatically one understanding of trade, the system is better held to account.
Furthermore, a foundry of ideas is crafted out of which could emerge proposals that genuinely challenge the normative foundations of the multilateral trading system and rouse it from the malaise in which it finds itself. for debate such that it centres on issues that resonate beyond the WTO and the Doha round. This will take much creative energy on the part of the secretariat and can only be achieved in consultation with civil society itself. Hosting civil society events organised around crosscutting issues related to mega-regional trade agreements, poverty alleviation, debt and finance, and sustainable development, among others, is one way to begin.
Sixth, the secretariat must make a stronger effort to engage civil society from the global South in Public Forums and ministerial conferences. Although the External Relations unit does a good deal in terms of in-country and regional outreach for civil society (and media), providing opportunities for private, non-state, non-for-profit actors to engage in debate and dialogue with their counterparts from around the world will enrich and balance discussions about the possibilities of trade to work for global development and produce welfare gains for all. As Hannah (2014) argues:
NGOs from the North, in particular, are directed by Western-educated, middle class people who speak from a position of privilege. This raises questions about the appropriateness of NGOs claiming to give voice to the poor and marginalized in international trade negotiations, and raises the risk that NGOs may serve to reproduce social hierarchies or inequalities in the global economy.
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If the transformative potential of civil society is to be realised and engagement with the WTO is to be fit for purpose, voices from the South must be included.
So, the terms of engagement with civil society should not simply reflect what the secretariat thinks and wants. They should be determined in consultation with others beyond the doors of the WTO. For selecting the topics of the Public Forum in particular, there should be a committee that has a range of constituents on board that cover the whole spectrum of opinion so that they are all forced into a dialogue. Whatever it produces, it will be more democratic, accountable, legitimate, and transparent than before. It may even produce something genuinely progressive and transformative-an outcome that pushes back against conventional wisdom while generating new ideas geared towards health, welfare and sustainable development priorities.
